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THE CASE AGAINST APPOINTING POLITICIANS TO THE 
SUPREME COURT 
Brannon P. Denning* 
INTRODUCTION 
Ben Barton’s recent paper concludes that the members of the current 
Court are more “cloistered and detached” than at any other point in the 
Court’s history.1 His findings are bound to renew calls for the 
appointment of politicians to the Court;2 but I argue that remedying the 
perceived deficit of life experience and “practical wisdom”3 by 
appointing persons currently or formerly active in partisan politics 
would likely not deliver the claimed benefits and might affirmatively 
harm the Court as an institution. 
I.  THE CASE FOR POLITICIANS ON THE COURT . . . 
Robert Alleman and Jason Mazzone recently argued that the absence 
of politicians on the current Court is an unwelcome historical anomaly.4 
Appointing politicians, they argue, would introduce an accountability 
occasioned by the nominee’s public record as an elected official who 
has “tak[en] definite stances on concrete legal and political issues” and 
“has suffered the slings and arrows of national electoral politics or has 
served in a high profile administrative office . . . .”5 Such persons have 
“acquired public trust before being placed in the least accountable of all 
federal offices.”6 By contrast, the pre-appointment vetting most 
nominees to the Court receive consists of a lengthy background check 
and confirmation hearings that “reveal virtually nothing about the 
nominee.”7 Alleman and Mazzone further argue that politicians can lend 
legitimacy to judicial decisions “involving the scope of powers of the 
branches of government” in which they’ve served.8 Moreover, “a 
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 1. Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment 
Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1172 (2012). 
 2. See, e.g., Robert Alleman & Jason Mazzone, The Case for Returning Politicians to the 
Supreme Court, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (2010). 
 3. Barton, supra note 1, at 1182. 
 4. Alleman & Mazzone, supra note 2, at 1359–61; see also Barton, supra note 1, at 
1154–55 (“One of the great surprises from studying the pre-appointment experiences of 
Supreme Court Justices is the sheer amount of time prior Justices spend as non-lawyer, elected 
officials.”) (footnote omitted). 
 5. Alleman & Mazzone, supra note 3, at 1384. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 1382. 
 8. Id. at 1385; see also id. at 1385–86 (suggesting former President Taft’s authorship of 
1
Denning: The Case Against Appointing Politicians to the Supreme Court
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
32 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 64 
 
national politician would bring to the Court a unique skill set acquired 
through experience in high-level legislative or executive positions.”9 
Their “statesmanship” and understanding of “political consequences” 
enable politicians to both “predict[] . . . and manag[e]” the “fallout” of 
the consequences attending controversial decisions.10 
II.  . . . AND A CASE AGAINST 
Color me skeptical. Given the highly partisan, polarized nature of 
contemporary politics, nominating individuals with a lifetime party 
identification is not a recipe for improving the perceived legitimacy of 
Court decisions. Each of the Justice’s opinions would likely be viewed 
through that partisan lens even more than today. Worse, it might be 
difficult for a politician cum Justice to shed party attachments even after 
donning her robes. Active politicians may also continue to harbor desire 
for—even pursue—elective office while serving as a Justice.11 
The politicians recently appointed to the bench also ought to give 
pause. For every Earl Warren, there is Fred Vinson. For every Charles 
Evans Hughes, there is James Byrnes, Frank Murphy, or Sherman 
Minton. The last elected official on the Court, Sandra Day O’Connor, 
was frequently criticized for opinions that were “ticket[s] for one train 
only,”12 providing little guidance for policymakers or lower courts. 
Recent politician-Justices have often been bored, overwhelmed, or 
frustrated by the technical, even tedious, nature of many cases on the 
Court’s docket. Several simply delegated responsibilities to their clerks. 
If Senators are unable to get much information out of today’s 
nominees during confirmation hearings,13 that says as much about the 
caliber of Senate questioning as it does about the reticence of nominees, 
especially those with records of judicial service. That active politicians 
would have acquired a lengthy public record on the burning legal and 
political issues of the day is, for me, a bug, not a feature. While 
Alexander Bickel’s description of judges having “the leisure, the 
training, the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the 
                                                                                                                     
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), enhanced its legitimacy). But see Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295U.S. 602, 627–29 (1935) (limiting Myers). 
 9. Alleman & Mazzone, supra note 2, at 1386. 
 10. Id. at 1388; Barton, supra note 1, at 1176–77 (suggesting that “[a]s the Court begins to 
more closely resemble a policymaking, ‘Olympian’ body, it is especially important to appoint 
individuals with real-life experiences,” including those gained in politics). 
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History and an Ethical Warning, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 115, 160–70 (2011) (describing the dangers 
of having politically ambitious Justices on the Court). 
 12. JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME 
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 13. Alleman & Mazzone, supra note 2, at 1382 (noting that Senators frequently ask 
questions written by staffers and “often do[] not know how to ask good follow-up questions”). 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 18
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/18
2012] THE CASE AGAINST APPOINTING POLITICIANS TO THE SUPREME COURT 33 
 
ends of government”14 edges towards a judicial nirvana fallacy,15 most 
prefer the Justices to come to cases with as much disinterest as engaged 
humans can muster. Litigants would question the impartiality of Justices 
who have taken well-publicized stands on issues before the Court; 
perceptions about the integrity of its opinions would likely suffer.  
Judicial opinions, moreover, are different from legislation. The latter 
requires no written record of reasons for preferring one option to 
another. The Court’s work product by contrast stands or falls based on 
the cogency of its reasoning. Its integrity and legitimacy depends on 
more than simply wrangling five votes. If the public sees the Court 
operating no differently than other political institutions, then the 
rationale for the Court’s unique features— life tenure, the lack of 
transparency, judicial review—becomes less apparent. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 14.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 25-26 (2nd ed., 1986) (1962). 
         15. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 40 (2006) (describing the “nirvana fallacy” as “[a] familiar shorthand . . 
. in which an excessively optimistic account of one institution is compared with an excessively 
pessimistic account of another.”). 
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